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THE OBLIGATION 
TO OBEY THE LAW1
It is often said that we have an obligation to obey the law 
just because it is the law. This idea has been espoused in the 
West at least as early as Socrates, and it is espoused today. It 
is not the special claim of any particular ideology, but has 
been held by advocates of most political persuasions. In times 
of crisis it is argued over with passion, and what is at issue is 
none other than the question of how much obedience and 
loyalty people owe to their political institutions.
Let us call the claim that people have an obligation to obey 
the law because it is the law the “obligation-to-law (OL) 
principle.” In what follows I shall attempt to state this 
principle in a clear and precise manner in the hope of 
capturing exactly what is meant by those who endorse it. I 
shall not attempt to evaluate the principle here, but to do the 
groundwork necessary for such an evaluation.
My task will be easier if we keep in mind the following 
questions: What kind of obligation does a proponent of the 
principle have in mind? What does he mean by ‘law’ and 
‘obeying the law’? Upon whom is this obligation supposed to 
fall? And how “powerful” is this obligation: that is, is it 
“absolute” or “prima facie” or something else?
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LEGAL AND MORAL OBLIGATION
The sort of obligation being claimed, I believe, is always 
moral and not legal. I shall use the phrase ‘legal obligation’ in 
such a way that it is necessarily true that if a law applies to a 
man he has a legal obligation to obey it. The assertion that a 
person has a legal obligation to do something is just the 
assertion that there exists a law, requiring him to do it, under 
whose jurisdiction he falls. What is being claimed by the 
proponents of the OL-principle, then, is that we have a moral 
obligation to fulfill our legal obligations.
It is also clear, I think, that those who claim that we have 
an obligation to obey the law are not arguing that it is always 
or generally in our best interest to do so. They are not just 
giving us prudential advice, for they would hold that we 
ought sometimes to obey the law when it is not in our best 
interest, or when we can get away with breaking it.
THE NATURE OF LAW
It is alleged, then, that there is a moral obligation to obey 
the law. But what is a law and how shall the term ‘law’ be 
used? The kind of laws I am talking about, it should be 
obvious, are the laws of a state. These can be distinguished 
from scientific laws in that they are prescriptive, rather than 
descriptive. They are rules intended to govern the behavior of 
rational creatures, who have the power to obey them or 
disobey them, as they wish. Descriptive laws, on the other 
hand, describe invariable or statistical regularities in nature; 
the entities they govern “obey” them because they must, not 
because they want to or think it best. The laws of a state can 
also be distinguished from moral “ laws” or principles. What­
ever else they may or may not be, moral principles are the 
standards of moral criticism and thus are not themselves open 
to moral criticism. The laws of a state, on the other hand, are 
open to moral criticism and thus cannot be identified with 
moral principles.
Most importantly, the laws of a state can be distinguished 
from the rules of the moral code of a society in that the 
latter are established and enforced by informal means, by
“mere opinion” and social pressure, while the laws of a state 
are the “official” and formal rules of the society. They are 
explicitly adopted by men who have the authority to make 
them, who have followed certain procedures, and who have 
established explicit sanctions to be applied to those who 
break their prescriptions. The laws of a state are distinguished 
from the rules of “positive morality” by the institution­
alization required for their establishment and enforcement. A 
law of a state is thus a prescriptive social rule, which is the 
product of some sort of explicit institutionalization.
A central task of the philosophy of law is to clarify the 
nature of the institutionalization that makes a rule into a law. 
Doing this is giving an analysis of the concept of law. In order 
to clarify the nature of the claim that there is an obligation 
to obey the law, I do not think it is necessary to give such an 
analysis. The claim rests on an “ intuitive” understanding of 
what the nontechnical term ‘law’ means and refers to in 
ordinary usage. Some of the arguments for the claim that 
there is an obligation to obey the law do, however, rest on 
certain analytical claims about the nature of law, and for the 
evaluation of those arguments these analytical claims need to be 
taken up.
It is also worth pointing out that a natural law theorist, 
like Aquinas, may disagree with some of the simple points 
about law I have made. For reasons of space I cannot go into 
his view and my reasons for rejecting it.
CITIZENS AND STATES
Citizenship. Upon whom is the obligation supposed to fall? 
I believe that proponents of the OL-principle have usually 
meant to hold that the obligation falls on the citizens of a 
state. This is not to say that noncitizens do not have an 
obligation to obey the laws of states they visit or reside in. 
They may very well do so, but the reasons for this 
may be different from the reasons why the citizens of a state 
ought to obey its laws; citizenship is supposed to bring with it 
a special obligation to obey the law.
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There is a problem, however, concerning the nature of 
citizenship. Citizenship is not a natural but a conventional and 
legal relationship between a man and a state. Theoretically at 
least it is possible for a state to extend citizenship—and its 
correlative rights and obligations—to people who do not reside 
in its territory, do not desire its citizenship and do not 
acknowledge it. Suppose, for example, that the members of a 
certain state are composed largely of people of one ethnic 
group and they pass a law conferring citizenship on people of 
the same ethnic group in a neighboring state. Suppose that 
the people in the neighboring state do not desire the 
citizenship, do not acknowledge it, and benefit in no way 
from it. Shall we say that they nevertheless have an obligation 
to obey the laws of the first state?
I do not think that those who hold there is an obligation 
to obey the law would hold that it falls on these people; 
rather they would say that for a person to have the obligation 
he must be a citizen in this sense: he must be a “part of the 
society” which that state directs. The notion of being part of 
a society is complex, but it means at least this, that the 
well-being the man achieves is dependent on the structure of 
social rules, conventions and laws of the society. And this will 
normally require residence within its territory.
In what follows I shall use the word ‘citizenship’ in this 
more “reasonable” sense, and I suggest that the obligation to 
obey the law is thought to fall on such citizens.
Must the state be just? There is yet another restriction that 
some will want to make. For reasons that will be brought out 
later, it may be held that the obligation falls on citizens only 
if their state has some special moral character, i.e. is just or 
good or democratic, and so on. For the sake of having a 
word, let us now take those who would say this as requiring 
that the state be just. To say this, incidentally, is not to say 
that citizens of unjust states need never obey the law. It can 
be held that they ought always to obey the good laws and 
other laws when disobedience would have bad consequences. 
But it is to say that they have no “overall” obligation to obey 
the law, in a sense to be clarified later.
From the clarifications already given, we can distinguish 
two claims, that any citizen of any state has an obligation to
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obey all of its laws or that only citizens of just states have 
this obligation. One who holds that there is an obligation to 
obey the law may have either of these in mind, and they 
must be distinguished.
THE VARIETIES OF LAW
Another clarification about law is necessary. H.L.A. Hart2 
and others have pointed out that not all laws actually 
prescribe or proscribe certain kinds of behavior. There are 
laws of a legal system, which Hart calls secondary rules, and 
which tell us just when a primary rule prohibiting or requiring 
some specific kind of action has been enacted. A legislator 
does not break a law if he fails to follow such procedures; he 
simply fails to make a law. Analogously there are laws that 
allow us to enter into agreements with others and thereby 
take on legal obligations; for example, under certain condi­
tions an act of ours can constitute the making of a contract, 
which is legally enforceable.
From these considerations Richard Wasserstrom has con­
cluded that
to talk about disobeying the law or about o n e ’s obligation to obey  
the law is usually to refer to a rather special kind o f  activity, 
nam ely, that w hich is exem plified by, among other things, actions 
in violation or disobedience o f a penal law .3
It seems to me that this is slightly misleading. Not all laws 
that prohibit or prescribe something are penal laws, e.g. a law 
levying a tax. Moreover, it seems that once we have made a 
legally valid contract, we then have a legal obligation to fulfill 
its terms and we thus act against the spirit of the law if we 
break it, other things being equal.
Consider, next, the case of a legislator who believes he can 
make it appear to people that a certain law has been enacted, 
although he has not gone through proper procedures. Suppose 
he does this and people obey the “ law,” and violators are 
punished. Has the legislator himself broken the law? What he 
has done is usually not punishable, and there may even be no 
statute precisely forbidding such acts. But, on the other hand,
OBEY THE LAW 71
72 SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE
he has not followed the appropriate, legally validated rules for 
enacting legislation. And it seems here that this is the 
significant thing. Whether this should or should not be called 
“law-breaking,” the overriding point is that the legislator has 
not followed the procedural rules of the legal system, and if 
there is an obligation to obey the law one violates it by such 
official lawlessness just as much as when one breaks a penal 
law. If there is an obligation to obey the law, it surely 
devolves not only upon ordinary citizens with respect to penal 
laws and contractual obligations, but also upon officials with 
respect to using proper legal procedures.
In sum, there are many ways in which we could fail to be 
law-abiding; and the obligation to obey the law might better 
be described as an obligation to be law-abiding, which 
includes obeying specific prescriptions of the laws, fulfilling 
legal obligations, and using proper legal procedures (even 
though their misuse by certain officials might not be a clear 
instance of law-breaking).
THE POWER OF THE OBLIGATION
Absolute Obligation. So far I have held that those who 
believe there is an obligation to obey the law because it is the 
law have in mind a moral obligation, which falls on the 
citizens of every state or of “ju s t” states and which is 
fundamentally an obligation to be law-abiding. We must now 
raise the question concerning what can be called the pow er of 
the obligation. I shall say that an obligation to do acts of 
kind X is absolute if it is always our actual duty to do any 
particular act of that kind when we are confronted with the 
alternatives of doing it or not doing it. An absolute obligation 
is never overridden in actual situations by other consider­
ations. It may be held that we have an absolute obligation to 
obey the law; to say this is to say that it is never morally 
justifiable in any concrete case to break the law. The 
obligation is never overridden by other moral features of the 
situation.
Few who reflect on the matter would nowadays hold this 
very stringent thesis. It is obvious that a state could set up
cruel and inhumane laws that ought not to be obeyed. The 
genocidal laws of Nazi Germany are examples of this. In the 
face of these examples, it is often suggested that the reasons 
such laws need not be obeyed is that a state like Nazi 
Germany is thoroughly corrupt and unjust and that there is 
no obligation to obey the law in such states. But it might be 
held if a state is good or just or democratic, then there is an 
absolute obligation to obey all its laws. It is never right to 
break the laws—even the bad ones—of a good state. If we call 
the first view, i.e. that the citizens of every state have an 
absolute obligation to obey all its laws, “absolutism,” we can 
call this more moderate view “modified absolutism.”
Modified absolutism avoids some of the more obvious 
counter-examples that plague absolutism, but it is still not a 
plausible view. Even the best of societies can, in a weak 
moment, enact the worst laws or embark on disastrous 
policies so that disobedience is justified. But to make this 
point, let us consider not a bad law of such a society, but a 
very good and reasonable law:
In the Com m onwealth o f  Pennsylvania it is unlawful to operate a 
m otor vehicle that has n o t been inspected. The penalty is not 
high—perhaps $ 25 , more or less, depending on the whims o f  the 
magistrate. But the action is unlawful. N ow  suppose an unin­
spected car is the only vehicle available for transporting an ill 
person to a hospital for urgently needed care. The position stated 
im plies that such an emergency w ould not provide a moral 
justification for breaking the law.4
It strains credulity, however, to suppose that anyone would 
hold that there is no moral justification for breaking the law 
in cases like this.
The general problem with this kind of absolutism is this: 
the fact that a particular act has the feature of conforming to 
a good law of a good society does not guarantee that the act 
will not have other features which would make its perfor­
mance disastrous from a moral point of view. Most impor­
tantly, from the feature of conforming to such a law, its 
actual consequences in a concrete situation cannot be “read 
off” or deduced, but are determined by the nature of the law
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at issue, the effects of obedience or disobedience on other 
people, the political situation, aind so on. It is always possible 
to imagine an act of obedience to the law having, in concrete 
circumstances, consequences that would make its performance 
morally unthinkable. The absolutist must either be blind to 
this or place too high a valuation on obedience to the law. I 
conclude, then, that both kinds of absolutism are implausible.
Prirm Facie and Presumptive Obligation. A weaker claim 
still is that the obligation to obey the law is a prima facie 
obligation. But the notion of prima facie obligation is 
complicated, and our first task must be to try to clarify it.
The phrase ‘prima facie obligation’ can be used in at least 
two different ways. When it is said that people have a prima 
facie obligation to do acts of kind X, this could be taken to 
mean that the fact that an act is of kind X is a good moral 
reason for doing it, though it may be outweighed by stronger 
reasons in particular cases. Or it could be taken to mean only 
that it is likely that any particular action of kind X will turn 
out to be obligatory. On the latter meaning the fact that an 
act is of kind X is not in itse lf a good moral reason for doing 
it, but suggests that there are likely to be such reasons. I will 
speak of there being a presumptive obligation to do X in the 
latter case and reserve the phrase ‘prima facie obligation’ for 
the former case.
We can gain a clearer understanding of prima facie 
obligation by noting that the view that there are such things 
as prima facie obligations goes along with the idea that there 
are “intrinsically” right-making and wrong-making features of 
acts. Consider, for example, the feature of causing an injury 
to someone other than the agent, and let us call this “M” for 
maleficence. W.D. Ross5 and others would hold that insofar 
as an action has M it is morally criticizable. We cannot, 
however, conclude without further information that such acts 
are actually wrong because, as we have noted, they may have 
other features which make them morally praiseworthy and 
override the fact that they are M. They are thus prima facie 
wrong, and the fact that an act is M is a good reason for not 
doing it. If the act is to be permissible in some situation its 
M-ness must be overridden. M, moreover, is the kind of feature
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that in itself makes for the wrongness of an act, not because 
it is connected with some other feature. That is why we can 
speak of M as being intrinsically wrong-making.
To understand the concept of presumptive obligation, let us 
consider the following claims about promising:
A Most of the time a person makes a promise he causes 
someone else to have certain expectations.
B Breaking the promise usually upsets those expectations.
C Having one’s expectations upset is being injured.
D Injuring someone is prima facie wrong.
Propositions A-D cannot be used to justify the claim that 
there is a prima facie obligation to keep promises because 
they allow the possibility that there be cases in which the 
making of a promise does not cause expectations and the 
breaking of it does not cause injury. In such a case, the fact 
that an act breaks a promise would not be a reason against 
doing it and that fact does not have to be overridden for the 
act to be justified. But because of the likelihood that when a 
promise is broken expectations will be upset, we can speak, 
given A-D, of a presumptive obligation to keep promises. 
There are likely to be good reasons against any particular act 
of promise-breaking.
There are two features of the above case that should be 
distinguished. First, the connection between breaking promises 
and causing an injury is contingent; it is logically possible that 
there be broken promises that cause no harm. Secondly, it is 
empirically certain that there will be such cases; that is, there 
are many acts of promise-breaking that cause no harm. Is the 
obligation only presumptive because of the contingent con­
nection between promise-breaking and harm or because of the 
empirical certainty that there will be broken promises without 
harm? This question calls for a decision as to how to make 
the distinction between presumptive and prima facie obliga­
tion, and I shall use these terms in such a way that what is 
important is the logical possibility of broken promises without 
harm. We can thus define the two kinds of obligation as 
follows:
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An obligation to  do (or n o t to do) acts o f  kind X is prima facie if 
and only if  X is an intrinsically right-making (or wrong-making) 
feature o f an action.
An obligation to  do (or n ot to do) acts o f  kind X is presumptive 
if  and only if  X is contingently connected  with an intrinsically 
right-making (or wrong-making) feature o f  an action.
The obligation to do X will be presumptive even if there is a 
universal law linking X to an intrinsically right-making feature, 
Y. I choose this way of talking because even in this latter 
case, it will still make sense to say that X does not give us the 
“real” reason why the act is right. The intuitive distinction is 
this: when X is prima facie obligatory, X is the reason why 
the act is obligatory, while when X is presumptively oblig­
atory, it is only connected to such a reason.
Complex Prima Facie Obligation. Before we can use this 
distinction there is one more case that we must bring out. It 
is possible that there be a feature of an act, X, such that it 
does not at first seem  to be the case that there is a prima 
facie obligation to do such acts, but when one examines the 
nature of X more closely, one finds that if an act is of kind 
X, it logically follows that it is also of kind Y and there is a 
clear prima facie obligation to do acts of kind Y. In such a 
case I shall say that there is a prima facie obligation to do 
acts of kind X and that X is an intrinsically right-making 
feature of an act. The peculiar feature of the case is that the 
term ‘X’ does not itself clearly identify the nature of that 
right-making feature or clearly express the reason why the act 
is right, although that reason can be drawn out by analyzing 
the concept of X. It may be, for example, that ‘X’ is a 
complex description and ‘Y’ is just one element of the 
complex and it takes some analysis to realize that Y is a part 
of X. For the sake of having a name, I shall call such a prima 
facie obligation a “complex prima facie obligation.”
As an example of a complex prima facie obligation, let us 
consider one of the arguments Socrates uses in the Crito to 
support the claim that there is an obligation to obey the law. 
Socrates held that a citizen, by not leaving his state, makes an 
agreement to obey its laws. This is not just a contingent
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matter; it follows necessarily from the fact that one is a 
citizen of a state and has not left it that one has made an 
agreement to obey its laws. Consider, then, an act of 
obedience to the laws o f  a state by a citizen. If Socrates’ 
analysis is correct, such an act is necessarily an act of keeping 
a promise. If there is a prima facie obligation to keep a 
promise, there will be an obligation to obey the law. The 
obligation is prima facie rather than presumptive because it is 
a necessary and not just a contingent matter that obedience 
to the law by a citizen is the keeping of a promise. Seeing 
that such obedience is the keeping of a promise is gaining a 
deeper understanding of what such obedience is; it is not 
coming to know a generalization based on the experienced 
concurrence of such acts of obedience and acts of keeping 
promises. The prima facie obligation, however, is complex 
because the phrase ‘obedience to the law by a citizen’ does not 
clearly reveal why such an act is obligatory. Analysis is needed 
to bring this out. Therefore, if Socrates’ analysis is correct and 
if there is a prima facie obligation to keep promises, there is an 
obligation to obey the law which is both prima facie and 
complex.
As we shall see in the next section, the concept of a 
complex prima facie obligation is extremely important as a 
tool for analyzing the claim that there is an obligation to 
obey the law.
Prima Facie Obligation and the Law. Given the distinctions 
above, to say that there is a prima facie obligation to obey 
the law is to say that the fact that an act conforms to a law 
is an intrinsically good moral reason for doing it and that 
being in conformity with a law is an intrinsically right-making 
characteristic of an act. This explains why it is said that there 
is am obligation to obey the law because it is the law—that an 
act conforms to the law is itself a good reason for doing it. 
On this view, moreover, the obligation to obey the law is not 
based on the content of particular laws. One has an obligation 
to obey a particular law, not because it is a good law or a just 
law or even because doing so has good consequences, but 
because it is the law.
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To say all this, however, seems to suggest that the 
obligation to obey the law is a “fundamental” one, like the 
obligation not to harm others; no further reason can be or 
need be given for the claim that one ought to obey the law 
other than “it is the law.” But against this, it seems clear that 
the claim that there is an obligation to obey the law is one 
that stands in need of some kind of justification. If acts of 
law-breaking are wrong, there must be some further reason for 
this other than that they are acts of law-breaking. Thus it has 
been held that the obligation to obey the law
m ust rest on som e more general principle; that is, it  m ust depend  
on som e principle o f  justice or upon som e principle o f social 
u tility  or the com m on good, and the like. . . .  I mean to exclude 
the possibility that the obligation to obey the law is based on a 
special principle o f its ow n .6
This seems to me clearly correct. The question of political 
obligation cannot be resolved by saying that there is an 
obligation to obey the law and tha t’s that—or by simply 
asserting that the fact that an act conforms to the law is an 
intrinsically good reason for doing it. It is not inconceivable 
that someone might argue this way, but not many people would 
be convinced by the argument.
If those who hold that there is an obligation to obey the 
law are committed to the view that the obligation is 
“ fundamental” and that no further reason can be given, then 
it would be reasonable to conclude that there is no prima 
facie obligation to obey the law. But I do not think that they 
are committed to this. They can claim that the prima facie 
obligation is a “complex prima facie obligation.” They can 
argue that it is possible to show, through an analysis of the 
concept of law, that every act of obedience to the law 
necessarily has some further feature which is intrinsically 
right-making and “fundamental.” To say that an act is right 
solely because it conforms to the law does not clearly identify 
the feature which makes it right, and it does not clearly 
express the reason why such acts are right. But the reason can 
be brought out by gaining a deeper understanding of what 
obeying the law really involves. Thus, the feeling that there
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must be a “further” reason why we ought to obey the law 
will be satisfied, but it can be said that this further reason 
was really involved in the original reason and that we just did 
not realize this. I believe that attempts to argue for an 
obligation to obey the law by reference to fair play, tacit 
consent, or the social contract are attempts of this sort.
Presumptive Obligation and the Law. It is important to 
note at this point that it is difficult to see how a utilitarian 
could defend the claim that there is a prima facie obligation 
to obey the law. The utilitarian must argue that obedience to 
the law, either in particular cases or in general, will have 
better consequences than disobedience. But it seems that it 
must be a factual matter as to whether an act of obedience to 
the law will have good consequences, or be a member of a 
class of acts that would have good consequences if generally 
done, or conform to a rule that would have good conse­
quences if everyone acted on it, etc. And thus it seems that 
the most the utilitarian can argue for is a presumptive 
obligation to obey the law.
It is important, however, to distinguish two kinds of 
presumptive obligations. If Y is an intrinsically right-making 
feature of an act and every case of X is, as a matter of 
empirical fact, a case of Y, then I shall say that there is a 
universal presumptive obligation to do X. If the connection 
between X and Y is less than universal, but many cases of X 
are also cases of Y, then the presumptive obligation is 
non-universal. It is at least arguable that every case of 
obedience to the law has, as a matter or empirical fact, some 
other feature which can be held to be prima facie obligatory, 
such as, if one is a utilitarian, having good consequences (or 
being of a sort that has good consequences, etc.). Then one 
could hold that there is a universal presumptive obligation to 
obey the law.
Many who hold that there is an obligation to obey the law 
seem to have such a universal presumptive obligation in mind. 
While this claim is not as strong as the claim that there is a 
prima facie obligation to obey the law, it is still strong and 
certainly controversial. If it is true, a person will always have 
some reason for obeying every law because if an act is an act
of obedience to the law, there will as a matter o f  fact always 
be a reason for doing it. Moreover, if it is ever right to break 
the law, there is always some reason to obey that has been 
overridden. It is, moreover, the strongest claim that can be 
made on utilitarian grounds, and many would defend an 
obligation to obey the law on just such grounds.
I suggest, then, that a proponent of the OL-principle is 
saying, with respect to the power of the obligation, either 
that there is a complex prima facie obligation to obey the law 
or that there is a universal presumptive obligation. Which he is 
holding will depend on what he appeals to in defense of his 
thesis: on whether he appeals to some necessary characteristic 
of all instances of law-abidingness or to some feature common 
to all instances, as a m atter of empirical fact.
THE STRENGTH OF THE OBLIGATION
We must now take up the question of the strength of this 
obligation. The strength of an obligation is a function of how 
easily it overrides or is overridden by other obligations. A 
weak obligation is rather easily overridden; a strong one 
overrides many others.
I think that those who hold that there is an obligation to 
obey the law would hold that it is a rather strong one. In 
other words, they would want to claim not only that there 
exists a “defeasible” obligation to obey the law, but also that 
it is very often our actual duty to obey the law. I shall now 
try to express this claim more precisely.
Let us note, first, that we can evaluate a law in terms of its 
content or in terms of the consequences of obeying or 
disobeying it in particular circumstances. To evaluate a law in 
terms of its “content” is to evaluate it either in terms of the 
moral character of the act prohibited or required, or in terms 
of the consequences of the law’s generally being followed. A 
law forbidding murder is a good law because murder is wrong. 
A law, such as the one discussed above, requiring the 
registration of automobiles is a good one because it would 
have good consequences if generally followed. But from the 
fact that a law is good (or bad) judged in these ways, it does
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not follow that the consequences of obeying it on a particular 
occasion will be good (or bad). Thus, in the example 
mentioned the consequence^ of obeying the automobile 
registration law were worse thaln disobeying it, since someone 
may have died had it been obeyed. On the other hand, there 
can be bad laws which are such that the consequences of 
obeying them in a particular case will be better than 
disobeying them.
First of all, consider good laws, i.e. laws whose “content” 
is good. A proponent of the obligation to obey the law would 
certainly say that such laws should be obeyed when the 
consequences of obedience are good. But what about a good 
law in those particular cases in which obedience would have 
worse consequences than disobedience? It seems to me that 
proponents of the obligation to obey the law would hold that 
in such cases the law should usually be obeyed. And the 
same, I think, is true of laws that are indifferent, neither 
particularly good nor bad. Again I think it would be said that 
such laws usually should be obeyed, even when there are bad 
consequences.
But what of bad and unjust laws? It seems to me, again, 
that it will be held that there are at least some cases in which 
such laws ought to be obeyed, even if obedience has worse 
consequences than disobedience. I suspect that most propo­
nents of the obligation to obey the law will hold that bad 
laws almost always ought to be obeyed. But as a minimum 
they will say that they must at least sometimes be obeyed, 
regardless of consequences.
In sum, then, I shall take the claim that there is an 
obligation to obey the law as asserting that the obligation has 
at least this strength: when the consequences of obedience are 
worse than the consequences of disobedience, it still requires 
obedience to good and indifferent laws m ost of the time and 
to bad laws some of the time.
SKEPTICISM
A person is a skeptic with respect to the obligation to obey 
the law if he denies both that there is a prima facie and a
universal presumptive obligation to obey the law. In denying a 
prima facie obligation to obey the law, the skeptic holds that 
the fact that an act is in obedience to the law is not in itself 
a morally good reason for doing it. The mere fact that an act 
is legally required (or prohibited) can not make right an act 
which is otherwise wrong (or make wrong an act otherwise 
right). The “mere legality” of an act is morally irrelevant. In 
denying a universal presumptive obligation to obey the law, 
he holds not only that “mere legality” is irrelevant, but that 
there are actual cases in which an act is legally required (or 
prohibited) and yet no moral reasons at all for doing it (or 
refraining from doing it). Sometimes there is no moral reason 
at all for obeying the law.
It should be clear that to say this is not to counsel 
universal disobedience, or to hold that anything goes, that 
murder is justifiable, or that we needn’t pay our taxes, and so 
on. In fact the skeptic can hold that almost all laws ought to 
be obeyed. He can note that many laws prohibit acts that are 
bad in themselves—malum in se; and he can hold that such 
laws ought to be obeyed. Other laws set up reasonable 
schemes of social cooperation which are designed to increase 
social welfare; and he can hold that these, too, should be 
obeyed. Moreover, he can hold that very often the conse­
quences of disobeying laws, even bad and unjust laws, are 
worse than obeying them, and thus he can claim that many 
bad laws ought to be obeyed. Thus, he can hold that there is 
almost always a good reason for obeying any particular law. 
In this way he can admit that there is a non-universal 
presumptive obligation to obey the law, based on the good 
content of most laws and on the bad consequences disobe­
dience often brings about. What he cannot admit is that the 
mere fact of illegality is morally relevant or that there is 
always a good reason for obeying the law.
I hope that this clarifies the issue between the skeptic and 
the nonskeptic and does away with one typical 
misconception—that on the one hand we have the proponent 
of the obligation to obey the law who stands for order,
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stability, civilization, etc., and on the other hand, the skeptic 
who espouses anarchism, chaos, instability, and so on. What is 
at issue is not the relative value of order vs. chaos, although 
this issue is certainly behind some of the arguments people 
give for the obligation to obey the law. What is at issue is the 
precise moral force of the invocation: “ do chat, because it is 
the law.”
THE OBLIGATION-TO-LAW PRINCIPLES
I have been trying to express what people have in mind 
when they hold that one has an obligation to obey the law 
because it is the law, and I have argued in summation that 
they have in mind the following:
There is a m ora l obligation to be law -ab id in g  which falls on the 
c itize n s  of either (a) every state or (b) states that are just. Being 
law-abiding means obeying legal prescriptions, fulfilling incurred 
legal obligations and following proper legal procedures. This 
obligation is no t an absolute obligation but either a c o m p le x  p rim a  
fa c ie  or a un iversa l p re su m p tiv e  obligation. I t has the following 
strength: it requires actual obedience to good and indifferent laws 
most o f the time and to  bad laws some of the time, even when the 
consequences of obedience are worse than the consequences of 
disobedience.
In conclusion we can distinguish the following four moral 
principles; for convenience, I shall simply refer to the strength 
of the obligation by saying that it is “ very strong” :
OL1: Every Citizen of every state has a very strong c o m p le x  
p rim a  fa c ie  obligation to  obey all the laws of his state.
OL2: Every citizen o f every just state has a very strong c o m p le x  
p rim a  fa c ie  obligation to  obey all the laws of his state.
OL3: Every citizen of every state has a very strong universal 
presumptive obligation to  obey all the laws o f his state.
OL4: Every citizen of every ju st state has a very strong 
universal presumptive obligation to obey all the laws of 
his state.
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Finally, when someone holds that there is an obligation to
obey the law, he has at least one of these four principles in 
mind.
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